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Social movement theorists have identified three elements that greatly affect the
likelihood of emergence and growth of a movement: resources, political opportunity, and
participant motivations or beliefs. Of these three, resources are often held as the most
important factor in the success of a movement, particularly in resource mobilization
theory. This essay seeks to address and evaluate the often undervalued role of beliefs in
the participant mobilization process and to refute claims that a favorable environment
alone can ignite and sustain a movement regardless ofparticipant attitudes.
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Gujarat, India, 1985. A dam is to be built on the Narmada River that will displace
85,000 people (Routledge 2003, 247). The government claims that the dam will provide
drinking water to drought-prone districts and irrigation water to distant farmers. The
government offers a relocation plan in which the predominately agricultural people of the
river valley are given small plots of infertile upland. Many of those who will be forcibly
uprooted will receive no compensation at all. Upon further research, it is discovered that
much of the irrigation water will go to sugarcane crops, recently planted by wealthy
members of the upper caste, instead of to poor subsistence farmers as promised (Sangvai
2000, 92). Many opponents also claim that much of the “drinking water” will actually go
toward industrial uses and if states decide to pipe drinking water from the newly-created
reservoir, they must do so at their own cost- an unrealistic outcome because the states
involved have “No money, no infrastructure and no idea of implementing such a plan”
(Sangvai 2000, 98). Additionally, the amount of water flowing in the Narmada was
grossly overestimated, so many of the additional benefits are unlikely to materialize. A
movement forms and letters are written. Protests staged. Lawsuits filed. Hunger strikes,
blockades, and marches are organized. Now, more than 20 years later, the dam stands,
uncompleted, at 88 meters (289 feet). All over the country large-scale development
projects are being questioned, the Narmada campaign used as an archetype for social
movements against exploitative development.
Fort McDowell, Arizona, 1968 (Welsh 1985, 150). The Bureau of Reclamation
intends to construct a dam at the confluence of the Verde and Salt Rivers in Arizona to
store surplus water and provide flood control (Espeland 1998, 112). Orme Dam is
authorized and five years later, the Yavapai Nation, a people constantly marginalized and
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repeatedly relocated since 1871, is notified that their reservation is to be flooded by the
project (Espeland 1998,195). With a history of massacres and death marches in their
not-so-distant past, tribal members refuse to watch their homeland, and culture,
inundated. They will no longer sacrifice their civilization for the gains of others. A
movement is organized and letters written. Protests staged. Lawsuits filed. Having
collected an army of religious, tribal, and civil rights groups as support, tribal leaders
threaten to take their case to the United Nations (Espeland 1998, 217). By 1981, the dam
project is canceled (Krol 2002).
Ganges River, India. More than 400 million people rely on the river for life. It
serves as not only a place for holy ceremonies, but as a source of drinking water. Yet the
river is also a public sewer and a dumping ground for industrial waste; 474 billion liters
of sewage, six million tons of toxic chemicals and nine thousand tons of pesticides are
discharged into the Ganges each year (Lyle 2006). Waterborne diseases such as typhoid
and cholera are rampant. Politicians claim to be committed, but corruption permeates the
system. There is no movement here.
The question for social scientists is “why?” Why do some movements fail while
others flourish? Why do movements not materialize when there appears to be severe
oppression and injustice? In order for a movement to emerge, persist, and ultimately
succeed, there must be a favorable environment. For the environment to be "favorable"
to social movements, researchers have identified three primary factors: resources,
political opportunities, and the motives of movement participants.
This paper will explore these forces, assess their relative importance and analyze
the connections between them. It will reaffirm the significance of resources and political
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opportunity. It will also explore the role of a true grievance, one that participants fell
passionately about and where people believe substantive change is truly possible.
While all three elements are integral to a successful movement, many theorists
argue the most vital of these is resources: often in the form of money, support and labor.

Resource Mobilization
Resources don’t often fall into the laps of movement organizers; movement
organizers and participants must actively pursue them continually throughout the
struggle. Although sometimes difficult to identify, there are almost always some
resources available to even the weakest movement. At the most basic level, members
bring their own energy and skills, which are incredibly valuable resources. But on
another level, there are often friendly restaurant owners willing to donate meeting space,
or a public figure who is sympathetic to the cause. As these examples demonstrate,
resources come from a wide range of sources, from minor personal involvement to large
contributions. Some examples of common contributions would be favorable media
coverage, elite supporters, supplies and expertise. Essentially, this category includes
anything that movements can use to further their causes.
The growth of movements can be circular: access to resources increases the
likelihood of success, which in turn increases participation, nurturing further success.
Each potential participant has a threshold for how much hardship and risk he or she is
willing to endure for the cause. Some people invest their entire lives in movements that
are incredibly demanding and have little chance of success while others contribute little
and get involved only when very limited risk or sacrifice is required. Each potential
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member performs his or her own cost/benefit analysis and decides whether or not to join.
Later, they may alter their participation or resign altogether, as costs and benefits shift
(Buechler 1997,194).
Because of this, leaders constantly strive to downplay movements' costs while
highlighting the benefits, in order to bolster participation. Clearly, numbers are vital to
movements because they represent legitimacy and power. Movements challenge
authority, which frequently has legitimacy and always wields power and thus, movement
leaders must convincingly argue that the movement speaks for "the people", and has at
least as much legitimacy as the authority being challenged.
To accomplish this, movements must achieve a critical mass of participation, the
scope of which is different in every situation. In the case of the Yavapai, the total
population on the reservation was near 400, including youth, so their seemingly small
support group of 144 adults (only one tribal member supported the dam) was a powerful
consensus. The Narmada campaign, however, had over 10,000 active participants, yet
the government continued to question its authority (Sangvai 2000, 50).

Internal Resources
Resources can be divided into two groups, internal and external. Internal
resources are those contributed by movement members and are as varied as the
participants themselves. This category includes labor, expertise, political connections,
and networking with other participants, to name but a few. Obviously, the more
individuals involved in a movement the more internal resources generated but large
movements prove difficult in other ways. For example, it is often difficult to keep
everyone organized and working together, using tactics that complement, rather than
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combat each other. Large movements also tend to factionalize into smaller movements as
a result of differing opinions in regards to strategies or objectives. Movement leaders
must strike a fine balance between having enough members to remain credible and
effective, while avoiding the destabilizing effects that often accompany large groups.
Money and organization are two additional internal resources which are highly
valued (Tarrow 1996, 85). Money is obviously an important resource, but not more
important than social connections among members. This is because if participants live in
close proximity, or their children go to the same school, for example, movements are
more likely to succeed for several reasons. Interpersonal relationships among
participants add to the cohesiveness of the overall group, and facilitate order.
Camaraderie and pre-existing relationships with members also provides a powerful
incentive for new members to become involved. (Jenkins 1983, 538; McAdam 1997,
179). A preexisting organization also provides for communication networks among
individuals (McAdam 1997, 180).
These benefits of human connection are even more pronounced if the movement
is built upon a pre-existing social unit, such as tribal connections in the Yavapai Nation
case study. Aldon Morris asserts that movement leaders often tap into “agency-laden”
institutions, which are defined as interpersonal structures existing prior to movement
formation. These can be any kind of association that provides a network for
communication, personal associations, or organization. In these situations, the movement
benefits greatly from existing order, cultural capital and resources (2000, 449).
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External resources
The second resource category, termed external resources, is also thought to be
important. In fact, many theorists believe external resources are essential to a
movement’s success. One school of thought in social movement theory, resource
mobilization, holds that a movement’s future, and more importantly its beginning,
depends heavily upon external resources. Charles Tilly (1978) argued that grievances, or
as I am referring to them, motivations, are present in all societies. Social movements,
then, are sparked by some change in the external environment, resulting in a
corresponding change in citizens’ attitudes. The basic premise for the most extreme form
of resource mobilization is that people always harbor ill feelings about one or more
aspects of society and given the proper environment a movement will occur.
Craig Jenkins has put forth the argument that personal motivations for joining
movements are “manufactured by the mobilizing efforts of movement entrepreneurs”
(Jenkins 1983, 530). McCarthy and Zald make a similar point: “Grievances and
discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and
organizations” (1977,1215).
This kind of grievance fabrication was not necessary in the Narmada and Yavapai
cases, however. In those instances there were tangible and well-defined grievances
against which members rallied. In both cases, the motivations for the movements were
not somehow latent, simply waiting for external forces or entrepreneurs to dredge them
from the hearts and minds of the people; they occurred in response to public projects
which posed a clear and immediate threat to those societies.
In these examples, a resource mobilization theorist might counter that while we

can say that there was a clear grievance on which these movements were based, we
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cannot say conclusively there were no other sorts of underlying grievances that could
have been amplified instead, given the proper external environment.
Were it true that other circumstances in the case studies, namely a positive shift in
external resources, could have independently sparked a social movement, then resource
mobilization theorists’ argument would be bolstered. However, there is really no way to
prove or disprove this hypothesis. In actuality, the participants involved in the Narmada
movement recognized they would have no future if they were moved to the resettlement
camps and the Yavapai believed they would suffer a spiritual death if they allowed their
lands to be flooded.
Neither the Narmada nor Yavapai movements grew out of chronic frustrations in
those social groups: clearly, they were sparked by well-defined, imminent threats to those
societies. Nonetheless, I believe Jenkins and the others would counter that, in effect there
is always something to mobilize against. Just because the Narmada and Yavapai
grievances grew out of threatening situations does not necessarily preclude the scenario
in which a positive shift in external resources (or political opportunity for that matter)
might easily have generated a movement based on some other grievance. In order
disprove this theory, one needs more than examples of "new" grievances, as is in the
examples above. What is needed here is a case in which the social environment is
conducive to a movement- with ample resources and opportunities in place- and no
movement appears. But before exploring that possibility, it is necessary to understand
the other major component of a favorable environment: political opportunity.
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Political Opportunity
Piistory has shown that the political landscape can greatly constrain or enhance
the growth of social movements. Political opportunity is defined as “consistent - but not
necessarily formal or permanent - dimensions of the political environment that provide
incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for
success or failure” (Tarrow 1996, 85). Essentially, people will be more likely to pursue
social change if they see a realistic prospect altering the situation, a political opportunity
to do so. This opportunity can present itself in many forms. Factors such as alignment
shifts, divided elites, emerging influential allies and increased access to power (as in
democratic elections) all lower the cost of collective action by making it easier to effect
change. Thus, these factors tend to precipitate movement action (Tarrow 1996, 86-89).
Political opportunity can sometimes be created by the movement itself. In the
Narmada and Yavapai case studies, leaders attempted to do this by making the general
public aware of their struggle. While they promoted their message in a variety of ways, a
technique common to both was to organized marches, a proven means of attracting public
attention. Marches are often used in social movements because participants already
know what is expected of them and less radical supporters are willing to participate
because marches remain a socially acceptable means of demonstrating. Marches also
reliably attract media attention, which is a valuable external resource because media
coverage is a powerful way to recruiting new members and gamering resources.
Media attention can create political opportunity as well. In the Narmada case, the
march drew international attention (which movement leaders had been striving for in
other ways as well; they often met with foreign leaders and kept them informed on the
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situation). This coverage made it more difficult for the Indian government to repress the
Narmada movement, as India had been working to the achieve status as a "first world"
nation in terms of not only development, but also in areas of democracy and human
rights. In order to maintain credibility in the international arena, the government was
forced to deal with the movement more diplomatically than could have possibly been the
case otherwise.
In the Yavapai example, the local media was controlled by a powerful family
which was strongly in favor of the dam (Espeland 1998, 119). Here, the marches
attracted reporting by outside media organizations which were less polarized and cast the
movement in a more favorable light. And while the impact of attention from outside was
perhaps less profound in this case, the added public awareness pressured politicians to
seek a viable solutions to the conflict instead of sweeping it under the rug. Positive
media attention can affect bystanders’ opinions, which in turn affect politicians’ choices,
which opens up political opportunities.

Participant Motivations
The third element that greatly influences a movement’s emergence, strength, and
ultimate success or failure, is the individual motivations of its participants. Broadly
speaking, there are two basic reasons people join movements, in effect two forms of
stimulus: material and moral. Material motivations are exactly that- the participants seek
to gain some personal material benefit from joining in the movement. The Narmada case
is an example of this. Initially, the reason people joined the movement was because they
were seeking the material benefit of a better resettlement package, primarily better land.
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Later, when they recognized the government was unwilling or incapable of providing
acceptable relocation packages, the movement shifted to protesting the dam itself. At
that point stopping the project was seen as the only way for the people to retain the land
they already had. This movement did not rise from an ethical injustice or moral
imperative; participants stood to personally gain something of value.
This is not to say that participants in the Narmada movement didn’t also have
moral convictions. Later in the movement, leaders asserted the main reason for the
struggle was to fight the oppressive Indian state. While this was clearly a moral goal, it
was actually a secondary concern during much of the movement’s early years, and
arguably remains a secondary goal for many participants. In fact, were the government to
offer adequate resettlement packages today, is likely many participants would abandon
the movement despite the fact it has claimed a morally-based opposition for quite some
time.
Conversely, in the case of the Yavapai, participants’ motivation was largely a
moral issue from the beginning. Government offers of comparable land or money were
refused because, for that population, it was not about material wants, but rather the moral
obligation to respect tribal history and maintain its culture.
One aspect of the Yavapai’s desire to keep their land was the experience of other
tribes in similar situations: in many of these cases, native cultures had gradually fallen
apart after accepting cash settlements in return for land. As one tribal elder stated, “Put a
dollar in one hand and the soil in another [sic], which will last longer?” (Krol 2002) This
aspect of the movement could conceivably be viewed as materialistic, yet the dominant
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motivation remained moral conviction: the prioritization of tribal heritage, culture and
longevity.
It could be argued that another dimension of the motivation spectrum is religious
in nature. I do not include spirituality as an entity in and of itself because it seems that
any spiritual motivation could be classified into the moral category, as in the case of the
Yavapai, who often discussed their moral convictions in terms of their spiritual beliefs.
In order to better understand these two ends of the motivation continuum, let’s
look more closely at the two successful anti-dam movements referenced above.

Narmada Bachao Andolan; Material Motivation
In the 1940s, the Indian government saw their goal of industrialization in the
foundations of hydroelectric dams. During the latter part of that decade, thousands of
projects were planned, including 30 major hydroelectric dams on the Narmada River.
One of the largest of these, the Sardar Sarovar Dam, would be located at Kevadia, a small
village in the state of Gujarat. The reservoir would submerge approximately 39,000 ha of
land (Turaga 2000, 239), displacing approximately 85,000 people (Routledge 2003, 247).
Construction of Sardar Sarovar began in earnest in 1979 after resolving disputes over
irrigation water rights between states (Baviskar 2004, 2004, 199).
The project faced little opposition until a doctoral researcher from the Tata
Institute of Social Sciences, Medha Patkar, arrived in 1985 to study the culture of the
Adivasi (the indigenous people of India) in the area. She was appalled at the plan put
forth by the government for relocation of the Adivasi and other displaced groups. Patkar
began organizing the citizens to demand more equitable relocation packages, a movement
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that would soon become known as Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), or Save the

Narmada Movement.
By 1988 it had become clear that the government had no intention of producing
an acceptable relocation plan and the movement’s goals shifted from amending the
relocation plan to rejecting the dam project altogether (Turaga 2000, 240). The
movement’s new slogan, Koi nahin hatega! Baandh nahin banega! (No one will move!
The dam will not be built!) echoed throughout the valley (Baviskar 2004, 203).
Participants vowed to drown in the rising waters before moving to substandard
resettlement sites. In the early 1990s, the movement staged a hunger strike demanding
construction of the dam be postponed until a comprehensive review could be completed.
Behind this tactic was the hope that an unfavorable report would provide a rationale for
halting the dam project indefinitely.
The World Bank commissioned a feasibility study in 1992, the results of which
were published in June of that same year. The report (referred to as the Morse report)
identified numerous detrimental effects of the project and recommended it be canceled.
The World Bank and state officials promptly dismissed the report in its entirety (McCully
1996, 304). However, after strong pressure from the international community, the
support of which was actively sought by movement leaders, the World Bank withdrew its
support in March of 1993 (Baviskar 2004, 204). The reversal of the World Bank’s
position had a much greater impact than the loss of funding. Ultimately, it signaled a
lack of support, which in turn pressured other groups to withdraw their support. The
World Bank withdrawal would not have been possible without pressure from foreign
investors: an illustration of the importance of external resources.
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Despite these setbacks, the Indian government continued with the project and as
the environment changed so did the campaign against it. In the early 1990s, the Narmada
movement made a second dramatic shift in its stance (the first being total opposition to
the dam); leaders now expanded their cause to include any people’s movement against a
destructive state or corporate project that strips the poor of their livelihood (McCully
1996, 306). This new umbrella organization, called the National Alliance of People’s
Movements (NAPM), sought to promote Indian social struggles by sharing participants
and resources among affiliated movements. This tactic was not nearly as successful as
the first. NAPM simply hasn’t enjoyed the support seen in the anti-dam movement,
perhaps because it is more difficult to motivate participants with moral claims,
particularly in developing nations.

The Yavapai Nation and Orme Dam: Moral Motivation
In 1944, the same time India began looking for a means of industrial growth in the
Narmada River waters, halfway across the world the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation set its
sights on the Salt and Verde Rivers. The Central Arizona Project (CAP) was designed to
store and regulate the flow of water, control flooding, and provide power. Orme Dam,
which was to be built at the confluence of the Salt and Verde Rivers, was billed by
proponents as an integral part of this essential public utility project (Espeland 2002, 379).
Not everyone, however was pleased at the prospect of a dam. The Yavapai tribe,
who inhabited the Fort McDowell Indian Reservation, would be forced off their land by
the reservoir that would flood two-thirds of their tribal holdings. In 1973 they were
offered 30 million dollars in exchange for their land, roughly $70,000 for each tribal
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member (well over $300,(X)0 in 2006 dollars). That offer was summarily rejected (Welsh
1985, 250). At the heart of the struggle was the fact the tribe regarded the land as much
more than real estate. It was sacred. Without the land they would have no religion. “If
the land is gone, there is no church, no altar,” wrote Elizabeth Brandt, a University
professor who works with many Arizona tribes (qtd. in Espeland 2002, 202).
The tribal members were frustrated by the government's lack of understanding of
this connection between the people and their land. Residents turned to comparisons in an
attempt to convey the relationship. ‘They would ask a negotiator how much money he
would charge for his children, or whether he would be willing to accept a ‘similar’ child
in exchange for his own child” (Espeland 2002, 208). Even these striking comparisons
failed to convince the Bureau of Reclamation of the toll the project would exact on the
Yavapai way of life. Ultimately, the tribe was forced to adopt more aggressive tactics.
Although their bond to the land was perhaps the most important factor in the
Yavapai’s refusal to leave, there were practical aspects as well. The tribal members
recognized that it was the land that bound their people together and they well
remembered the tragedies that befell other tribes who had relinquished their land for
money, following World War II (Espeland 2002, 202).
The Yavapai successfully opposed the dam, despite the fact that their internal
resources were limited. There were only 400 people on the reservation, forty percent of
whom were unemployed and two-thirds made less than $5,000 a year (Espeland 1998,
284). But there were also aspects of their situation from which Yavapai benefited. They
used their traditionally inferior status to generate outside support and to maintain member
morale (Espeland 2002,184). They gained tremendous advantage from employing the
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“Yavapai Identity” as a unifying force.
In 1981 the tribe staged a march from the reservation to the state capital 32 miles
away. The march was billed as a reenactment of the Trail of Tears. The original Trail of
Tears, which took place in the winter of 1875, was the result of an order by Ulysses Grant
to relocate 1,400 Yavapai to a relatively infertile Apache reservation 200 miles away. It
is widely suspected that contractors who sold supplies to the reservations believed the
tribe was becoming too self-sufficient and allegedly used their political connections to
uproot the Yavapai. The march lasted almost two weeks and many died of starvation,
frostbite or fatigue. Linking the two marches reinforced the claim by movement leaders
that protection of the land was a cultural imperative. It reminded participants of Yavapai
identity, their long history of broken treaties and that the Yavapai have always been and
are still being oppressed (Espeland 2002, 188, 208, 220)
The Yavapai also had the benefit of some external resources as well. One
influential supporter was U.S. Interior Secretary Stewart Udall. Udall ensured that native
concerns were addressed, and was a strong advocate for taking Orme Dam out of the
extensive dam project (Coffeen 1972, 360). There was also support from unexpected
sources, for example, local citizens who used the untamed river for recreational
enjoyment. One particularly colorful group was the "tubers", who showed up at hearings
wearing swimsuits and innertubes to protest the dam (Espeland 2002, 119). The tubers
also demanded to be included in the cost-benefit study, although the methodology of this
proved troublesome and was excluded from the final analysis (Espeland 2002, 160).
These groups brought not only resources, but also legitimacy to the movement, which
was a significant factor in the movement’s success.

17

Analvzine the Adivasi and Yavapai
At first glance, these struggles seem to be very different cases, perhaps too
different to provide a useful comparison. It would be ideal, in terms of evaluation, for
these two cases to have occurred in the same place and time: such a case study would
ensure that both the essential factors of political opportunity and available resources were
equivalent. Unfortunately, however, this kind of ideal example is rarely found in any
study of comparative politics. In this research it was difficult to find a comparable
morally motivated case because purely moral struggles don’t appear in developing
countries nearly as often as materially-motivated ones.
These cases are fairly comparable in many ways, however. The cases are
remarkably similar in that both deal with dam displacement, the groups affected are
indigenous people economically tied to the land and who are exceptionally poor by
relative standards. They could not survive without the land or the community it
supported. Also, these two cultures, significantly different from the majority, were being
sacrificed by their respective governments at the altar of nation building. These
communities were seen by government institutions (although this of course was never
verbalized) as expendable in the name of progress. In the Narmada movement, when
ousted families asked for an explanation for their suffering, the government said it was
for the “larger, national” interest (Sangvai 2(XX), 39).
The two case studies provide a useful comparison of the two extremes on the
continuum of participant motivations. One example clearly demonstrates a movement
driven by material gains, the more common of the two. Many movements at least begin
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with material grievances because people like to be able to clearly see why they should be
involved and how they might benefit from movement involvement. Nothing is clearer in
this respect than personal gain. While it is common for movements to evolve moral
aspects over time, the incentive for personal gain certainly helps a movement become
established.
In the second case, the Yavapai movement was clearly based much more on moral
convictions. Here, the core issues were preservation of culture, religion, and history. This
is not to say that there were no material gains to be had, at least by certain groups within
the movement. One example is the recreational opportunities that would be lost. The
hope of maintaining a free-flowing river brought in the support of the tubers, fishermen
and others who enjoyed the river in its natural state. This illustrates the fact that although
movements may originate from moral conflicts, they almost always develop a
materialistic component. Examples of purely moral movements are incredibly rare. In
fact, human materialism has proven to be an excellent motivator, one which movement
leaders exploit whenever possible. Thus, most movements include at least some
participants who stand to gain something personally.
It seems the vast majority of movements keep a foot in both camps, and for good
reason. In the Narmada case, the material gain of economically viable land (if only
keeping the land they already have) is a strong motivator. There are other people
involved in that struggle, however, who do not stand to gain anything material. Citydwellers who lend their support and the intellectual leaders who devote time and energy
don’t have a material stake in the struggle. For these contributors, the incentive is
something entirely different. They see the project as an injustice or unnecessary. This
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kind of scenario is very common in movements. As we have seen, not all participants are
there for the same reasons. Because of this, movement leaders must bill the struggle in a
variety of ways, casting a wide net in order to capture as many supporters as possible.
Another interesting pattern that arose from comparing these two cases was the
trend for movements to evolve from material motivations to moral ones. Of course, this
certainly isn’t always true, but these two cases support the hypothesis that movements
more commonly begin with a material concern and move towards a moral goal, or at least
incorporate a moral goal. Why not the other way around? First, as stated before,
material gains are great motivators and can get a movement off the ground, so if there are
material benefits to be gained, they are usually promoted early in the movement.
Another explanation could be because beginning with a moral goal and then
shifting to a material goal seems to somehow cheapen the entire movement. For
example, if the Yavapai had originally voiced their discontent in terms of not being
offered enough money for their land, their claim that they couldn’t "sell their mother”
would have been much less convincing. Another possible conclusion is that some kinds
of moral fights are less compatible with material goals. A future study containing more
cases could shed some light on this issue, but these two cases cannot provide a definite
conclusion here.

Resource Mobilization in Light of the Cases
As mentioned earlier, a significant element contributing to the success or failure
of movements is the conviction of their participants. Simply participating in a movement
definitely provides some benefits to members; involvement brings a sense of belonging,
camaraderie, accomplishment, altruism and meaning to one’s life. But people don’t tend
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to mobilize for small causes because there are always risks involved, too. Many Yavapai
who were engaged in the movement spoke of the strain on their family as a result of their
involvement: they felt they spent most of their time either just returning from, or leaving
for a meeting. The fact is, movements are labor-intensive, which takes a toll on people
and their loved ones. Participants always bear the emotional weight of commitment, and
the loss of valuable time.
So unless the cause is great enough to offset its cost in money, time and emotional
drain on participants and their families, there will be no movement. But, as said before,
having resources and political opportunities lower the cost of action. Thus, there is a
sliding scale between how strongly the cause is felt by participants, how much political
opportunity exists and how many resources are available. The weaker the convictions of
participants, the more opportunity and resources a movement needs to be successful. The
reverse is also true.
This idea supports the resource mobilization theory. If there is in fact a sort of
recipe for movement mobilization (more motivation needs fewer resources, less
motivation needs more) it might be possible for a movement to have enough resources
and opportunity that it could propagate a very minor grievance. This may be true
theoretically, but it is doubtful that there could ever be a movement which enjoyed such
an overwhelming abundance of resources and political opportunity that participants
actually needed very little true motivation. In fact, it seems that this really wouldn’t be a
“movement” at all. Such a situation would hardly need participants, or at least not
enough to classify as a movement.
Because movements are never able to rely entirely upon external resources and
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political opportunity for success, leaders must depend on participant motivation to carry
movements. In order to alter or create attitudes which attract members and encourage
participation, leaders devise social movement frames. Resource mobilization theorists
acknowledge that there must be some kind of grievance to create a movement, but they
believe that through framing, movement leaders can attract participants and expand
movements, regardless of how small the original grievance. A deeper understanding of
how leaders create and use frames can help to evaluate the validity of this hypothesis.

Social Movement Frames
The study of framing began with sociologist Erving Goffman. Goffman described
frames as schema that allow individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label”
occurrences within their own lives (Goffman 1986, 21). From these “individual frames”,
social scientists gradually applied the concept to group frames in social movements
(Snow and Benford 2000 B, 464). Snow and Benford describe social movement frames
as this:
“Frames help to render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby
function to organize experience and guide action [by] simplifying and
condensing aspects of the ‘world out there’ but in ways that are intended
to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to gamer bystander
support, and to demobilize antagonists” (qtd. in Snow and Benford 2000
B, 614).

Framing is used to shape the way in which people perceive situations. This can be
accomplished by the way an action or event is presented, by connecting it to other actions
or events, or by highlighting some actions or events more than others. These techniques
are used to remind people why the movement, whatever its goal, is worth individual and
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collective sacrifice.
Collective action frames also define the goals of a movement. If a group's goals
align with available political opportunity or some external resource (as the Yavapai’s
goals were in sync with those of Interior Secretary Stewart Udall) the probability of
success is higher. Therefore, frames are often tailored to align a movement’s goals with
available resources. A single frame usually cannot accomplish all necessary tasks.
Commonly, a movement will employ several frames to satisfy these different
requirements (Kowalchuk 2005, 241; Westby 2002, 289). In the Narmada case,
movement leaders recognized the need to impact several different target groups: the state,
public bystanders (citizens not directly involved with the movement) (Snow, Soule, and
Kriesi 2004, 199-201), and those directly affected by the dam (Baviskar 2004, 226). In
order to maximize participation and maintain long-term support, each group required a
different frame.
While a movement frame accomplishes a number of things, motivating and
mobilizing participants are two of its most vital tasks. To encourage existing participants
and bring in new members, frames must address three core issues: the first, diagnostic
framing, is perhaps the most basic element of a social movement frame. Movement
participants need something to mobilize against, therefore diagnostic framing assigns
blame for an adverse situation to guilty parties or institutions (Snow and Benford 2000 B,
616).
In addition to identifying a perpetrator, movements also need a strategy for
addressing key problems: essentially, a plan of attack. This is the second element of a
movement’s framing, known as prognostic framing.
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Finally, motivational framing is utilized to encourage people to join and stay
active in the movement and make people more supportive of the cause (Snow and
Benford 2000 B, 617). In order for people to effectively mobilize, they must not only
feel wronged, but must also believe their efforts can alter the situation (qtd. in Morris
2000, 446). At a minimum, participation must invoke a feeling of satisfaction among
members from simply making their grievances known (Kowalchuk 2005, 240).
Motivational framing attempts to accomplish these goals.

Elements of an Effective Frame
Movements need to take every advantage in order to be successful; leaders
cultivate and capitalize on members’ motivations utilizing collective action frames. That
said, an effective frame is often difficult create. First of all, a frame must resonate with
the intended audience (Snow et al 1986,477). As Goffman discussed, people employ
individual frames to assess everyday circumstances; they rely on past experience to
decide how to react to current situations. Created movement frames must be consistent
with constituents’ individual frames (Babb 1996, 1033).
To achieve this resonance. Snow and Benford assert a frame must both be
perceived as credible and believable (2000 B, 620). Frame credibility requires continuity
among beliefs, claims, and actions of the movement and there must be an apparent
correlation between frames and actual events. In practice, a movement's credibility
depends largely on the credibility of the ‘frame articulator’, typically the movement
leader (Snow and Benford 2000 B, 620). In the Narmada case, for example, Medha
Patkar (the intellectual who began the movement) initiated her campaign by gaining the
trust of the valley inhabitants by living there (McCully 1996, 301).
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Salience of a given frame (the second element required for resonance) depends, in
turn, on three factors: consistency with everyday experiences, relevance to personal
beliefs and connection with the cultural ideology (Snow and Benford 2000 B, 621). In
the Yavapai movement, leaders intentionally kept cultural values at the forefront of the
movement because tribal history is an integral part of the cultural ideology and this
connection made participation appear to be a cultural responsibility; this method was
extremely powerful in a community that placed so much importance on heritage.
After its initial alignment, a movement frame cannot remain static because
movements are subject to constantly changing environments (Snow and Benford 2000 A,
57). Not only the needs of participants, but the external environment from which
movements gather resources, are continually shifting. Frames, then, must constantly
adapt in order to remain effective. As Snow et al. profess, “Frame alignment, once
achieved, cannot be taken for granted because it is temporally variable and subject to
reassessment and renegotiation” (1986,476).

Frame Shifts
Frame alignment and frame shifting occur for a variety of reasons. In the
Narmada Dam movement for example, leaders often changed their prognostic framing
simply because they found that dramatic shifts revived battle-weary participants (Fisher
1995, 191). In this case, a physically demanding approach, such as blockading the road
to the dam to stop the flow of materials to the site, was followed by less demanding
tactics, like writing letters to foreign lenders (Palit 2003, 8).
Frame shifts can result either from ideological changes within a movement or a
strategic decision by framers (as in the preceding example). Although one might assume
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that frames presented by a movement mirror the ideology of its leaders, this is not always
true (Westby 2002, 292). In many cases it is necessary for leaders to alter frames in order
to make the movement more marketable. The Yavapai might talk more about the
importance of honoring treaties when pandering to Congress and more about river
habitats to environmental groups. Framers must maximize their effectiveness by finetuning their appeals to correspond with the beliefs and values of their target audience
(Kowalchuk 2005, 241, Westby 2002, 287).
This kind of highlighting certain issues and downplaying others allows
movements to gain maximum support in a variety of ways. A delicate balance must be
reached in order to cater to a movement’s “cultural setting, [a movement’s] political
opponents and the militants and ordinary citizens whose support it needs” (Tarrow 1996,
123). That said, organizers must also avoid being perceived as inconsistent or insincere.

Frame Development and Modification
There are three basic processes through which frames are developed and
manipulated. The first, the discursive process, deals with frame development. In this
process, a frame evolves and matures through communication among movement
members. This can result from two primary tactics. Frame articulation is the discussion
of how events are related in order to present a picture of the situation. This may be
connecting two seemingly unrelated events. In the case of the Yavapai, movement
leaders effectively associated the Trail of Tears with the building of Orme Dam as two
examples of attempted ethnocide.
Frame amplification is the second way for a frame to be developed or enhanced
by internal discussion. In this case, specific events are highlighted while others are
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downplayed to make a perpetrator's actions seem more egregious (Tarrow 1996,122).
Frame formation and manipulation can also be stimulated through contested
processes, in which frames are altered in response to conflict. These challenges are
categorized as frame disputes, counterframing, or dialectic tension. Frame disputes arise
from within a movement as disagreements about the diagnosis and prognosis of a frame.
Counterframing arises from pressure initiated from outside the movement that attempts to
undermine the validity of a group’s frame. Repeated counterframing efforts between
opposing groups can lead to framing one-upmanship, referred to as "framing contests"
(Ryan 1991).
These types of conflicts are evident between the NBA and the government in the
Narmada movement. The government first called on those who were to be displaced to
make personal sacrifices so that the lives of their countrymen would be vastly improved.
As the former chairman of the Narmada Valley Development Agency stated, ‘The family
getting displaced thus makes a sacrifice ... so that others may live in happiness” (qtd. in
Baviskar 2004, 223). But the families living on the Narmada were unwilling to make that
sacrifice and began framing a movement against the state's agenda. To counter this
frame, the government shifted its stance, asserting that those who had already been
relocated welcomed the move and viewed it as a step toward a better life (Baviskar 2(X)4,
223). As demonstrated here, the struggle between opposing groups can precipitate frame
shifts; this is counterframing.
The final way in which movement frames evolve is the strategic process, also
called frame alignment. Through this process, movements adapt their frames to achieve
specific goals such as the acquisition of resources or the recruitment of members. As
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discussed earlier, resources are incredibly important to the success of a movement, so
frames evolve in order to better situate the movement to benefit from available resources
(Snow and Benford 2000 B, 624). To achieve resonance, as discussed previously,
movements turn to frame alignment so that movement frames can adapt to the myriad of
personal and cultural frameworks in any society.

Frame Alignment
The concept of frame alignment includes four basic sub-categories. The first is
frame bridging which is the attempt by movement framers to connect two similar but
structurally independent frames (Snow et al 1986,467). Frame amplification, the second
type, relies on strengthening people’s pre-existing beliefs. If, in the Narmada case, some
Adivasi believed that the government was corrupt, but for one reason or another did not
feel that it was a paramount issue, movement leaders would most likely use frame
amplification to attract those individuals. Because a key factor of success is a frame’s
ability to connect with existing frames, it is not surprising that frame amplification is one
of the most utilized framing strategies (Snow and Benford 2000 B, 624). This strategy
seems to be particularly valuable in groups that hold beliefs which are radically different
from the cultural mainstream. In order to survive and prosper, these groups must redefine
and clarify certain aspects of their attitudes which are in agreement with the larger social
group (Berbrier 1998). Neither the Narmada or Yavapai movements were outside
cultural expectations, therefore this tactic was unnecessary. In fact, both originated in
cultures that were accustomed to social unrest and incorporated that into their political
tactics.
The third strategic alignment process, frame transformation, relies on changing
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people's perception of events which they have already cataloged into some other
framework (Snow et al 1986,474). Although it appears to be a commonly-used strategy,
research on this type of frame alignment has been limited (Snow and Benford 2000 B,
625).
The final way leaders alter frames to gather support is referred to as frame
extension. When using this strategy, movement framers broaden the scope of the initial
frame in order to attract a wider cross-section of prospective supporters (Snow et al 1986,
472). We see this kind of frame alignment in the Narmada case more recently. The shift
that created NAPM, the movement that identified and supported any people’s movement
against a destructive state, was implemented gradually, which probably made the
relationship between the two frames more clear and convincing. But despite this, frame
extension was not particularly successful for the Narmada movement, although it often is
(Cornfield and Fletcher 1998, 1305).
While frame extension can capture more support, participants, and resources for a
movement, it does have inherent weaknesses. As with most framing decisions, frame
extension can cause severe disagreements within movements concerning “issues of
ideological ‘purity,’ efficiency, and ‘turf’” (Snow and Benford 2000 B, 625). This tactic
is vulnerable to instability, resulting from a frame becoming overly vague or ambiguous.
This was one of the problems that befell the Narmada movement when leaders attempted
to extend existing frames. Their new all-encompassing frame proved too broad. The
effect was that participants were not convinced that they should make even more
sacrifices in order to further campaigns in which they were not directly invested (such as
closing a Coca-Cola plant). This problematic state is referred to as "clouding". As Snow
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et al caution, “Adherents and conscience constituents may not embrace the extended
frame as enthusiastically as they would a relatively clear, domain-specific frame” (1986,
478). If the frame extension is not a logical continuation of the original ideals, the entire
movement is at risk of losing credibility (Youngman 2003, 353).

Framing tactics used by the Narmada and Yavapai
As outlined above, both the Narmada and Yavapai employed a variety of framing
tactics. The appropriateness of a frame, and also changes made after the initial selection,
depends on the intended audience. Here, pertinent questions for framers are, what kinds
of frames do potential participants already have from which new frames could be
extended and which existing frames require alterations so that new frames can be
accepted? What events do participants consider important, and how were those events
initially interpreted? Framers also must take into account factors beyond the beliefs of
potential new supporters. An example of this would be the way in which opponents or the
media have already framed a given issue.
In the two cases discussed here, leaders employed some of the same techniques.
Both used frame bridging to align their campaign with environmental concerns, and
connect with existing indigenous rights frames. The Yavapai employed frame
amplification, heavily emphasizing the importance of cultural preservation. The
Narmada movement leaders used frame extension when broadening their scope to any
social injustice at the hands of the state and made a diagnostic shift when they moved to
total opposition of the dam.
This illustrates framing tactics are not necessarily specific to the kinds of
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motivations they are framing around. It also implies that there is no one framing tactic
that works best in all cases. Although movement leaders constantly reevaluate their
strategies, they almost never hit on one perfect frame that can sustain the movement for
the entire campaign. While there may be (and usually is) some prominent theme(s) that
remain unchanged throughout a movement’s existence, the frames used to articulate its
message are constantly shifting.

The Ganges River: the Apathetic Masses
The Ganges River flows for 1,560 miles from the glaciers in the Himalayas,
through India and Bangladesh to the Bay of Bengal. To most Hindus, who comprise 13
percent of the world population, the river is a Mecca (CIA). A person who bathes in the
river is cleansed of his sins and a person whose ashes are scattered in the river breaks the
cycle of rebirth and reaches nirvana. While this river is incredibly important spiritually,
it is also vital in secular ways. Nearly one-fifteenth of the world’s population lives on its
banks and many more rely on it for irrigation and drinking water (Lyle 2006). To the
people of the Ganges, this waterway is sustenance, both spiritual and physical. It is life
and death.
Because so many rely on this river for physical and spiritual "life", it is important
to keep it clean. Every day, however, an estimated 1.3 billion liters of raw sewage flow
into the Ganges. No more than 250 of the country’s 4,000 cities and towns have sewer
systems (Cooper 1997) and industrial waste, fertilizers and chemicals pour into the river
by the tons (Lyle 2006). Deforestation has dramatically increased its silt load, and
irrigation has drastically lowered its volume; as a result, water at the river's banks, where
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people go to bathe, do laundry and obtain water, is stagnant (Sharma 1997). Water
samples collected in Varanasi revealed fecal-coliform counts 10,000 percent higher than
the standard for safe bathing (McLeod 2004).
Not surprisingly, disease flourishes along the Ganges; 40 to 45 percent of those
who bathe in the river have skin or stomach ailments and water-borne diseases have
become commonplace. Hepatitis, dysentery, typhoid and cholera claim the lives of more
than two million Indian children each year (Stille 1999,60). The World Health
Organization estimates 80 percent of all diseases in the country and one third of all deaths
can be traced to poor sanitation and untreated sewage (Cooper 1997).
In addition to health concerns, there are important environmental issues. Rare and
little-understood species live in the Ganges. The Ganges River Dolphin, for example, is
one of only four types of river dolphins in the world. Dams, fishing, and dolphin hunting,
together with pollution, have pushed the animal to the edge of extinction. The rare
freshwater Ganges Shark faces a similar fate.
By 1981 the Indian Government officially recognized the Ganges as a national
resource and began looking seriously at possible clean-up options (Alley 2005,160). The
Ganga Action Plan (GAP), launched in 1985, instituted a string of improvements
including 35 large sewage treatment plants (Sharma 1997) and 28 electric crematoria,
along with stricter environmental laws.
These developments were funded by a variety of sources. The Dutch government
designed and paid for two wastewater treatment plants. They also funded the restoration
of sewer lines and construction of an industrial sewer to handle toxic leather tannery
waste (Alley 2005, 166). Several nongovernmental organizations sponsored other
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projects in the plan. India also received funding from the World Bank and development
loans from Japan, France, England and the United States (Alley 2005, 160).
Despite the overwhelming international and nongovernmental support, the GAP
proved fruitless, due largely to political corruption. The courts, on the other hand, worked
hard to ensure that the GAP plans were properly implemented. From 1992 to 1995 the
court dedicated every Friday to reviewing matters which dealt with pollution (Alley
2005, 149). M.C. Mehta, an activist and lawyer, argued two cases in front of the
Supreme Court. One case demanded that tanneries be held to the environmental laws, the
other dealt with the city of Kanpur not treating domestic sewage as ordered (Alley 2005,
146). As a result of these lawsuits, hundreds of factories were shut down. However,
many cities named in the suit successfully claimed no responsibility due to lack of
funding (Alley 2005,149).

Analyzing the Ganges: Where are all the people?
At first glance, it would seem that the Ganges situation offers plenty of issues for
mobilization, on either a moral or material basis. The river is sacred and the dominant
faith places great emphasis on environmentalism (Alley 2005,48). Rare species, on the
brink of extinction, live in its waters. The health concerns are real and the pollution is
clearly visible. Strangely, however there is no movement. A small group of intellectual
elites organized the Swatcha Ganga in 1982, a movement dedicated to cleaning up the
river, but there has been very little participation (Ahmed 1990,44).
The three things upon which every social movement depends are political
opportunity, resources, and participants. In this case there was ample political
opportunity. Politicians were receptive to the movement as shown by interest in the
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Ganga Action Plan (although its downfall was probably based in unrealistic views of
India’s capabilities and political corruption). The courts, as we have seen in both this and
the Narmada case, were fairly sympathetic toward environmental movements and India is
democratic, which also opens an array of political possibilities.
The second element, resources, is the most important element to the success of a
social movement, according to resource mobilization theorists. So perhaps, if we follow
the lead of Charles Tilly and the others, we could say the problem is a lack of external
resources. In this case, however, resources are plentiful. The Swatcha Ganga is funded
by the Sankat Mochan Temple, one of the most important temples in Varanasi, the largest
city on the Ganges. This institution provides organization, a key internal resource that
theorists cite in movement mobilization.
Religious frameworks have proven incredibly powerful mobilization tools, as
shown by the US civil rights movement. Because India's “agency-laden institutions” did
not produce adequate participation however, movement entrepreneurs attempted to reach
sympathizers in other ways. They held music festivals, open forums, and street comer
meetings. They organized conferences for priests, women, boatmen. They had contests
in attempts to interest school children (Mishra 2005, 2; Ahmed 1990,44). The public
remained immovable.
The religious group also provided money. Many private donors, such as Oz
GREEN, an Australian based environmental group, provide large amounts of capital to
the project as well, and the Tides Foundation, a group based in the US which strives for
social change, continues to provide money and technical support. It seems the movement
is not suffering from a lack of funding or other kinds of support.
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This movement does not suffer a lack of resources. There was (and still is) a
favorable political climate. There was a preexisting organization. There was money.
And media. And friends in high places. But there are no participants. Perhaps the
entrepreneurs aren’t framing the issue properly, although various organizations have tried
a multitude of angles. They have attempted bridging it to related frames, amplifying the
environmental concerns. Leaders promoted the movement as a class struggle because
most of those impacted by water quality are lower caste. Educational campaigns were
waged for adults and children. They even tried changing the diagnostic frame by
pointing fingers at Muslim tannery owners. There just wasn’t support.
The primary reason for this lack of support is that people simply feel no sense of
injustice. They never believed the river was polluted. Not that they couldn’t see the
effluent, smell the stench. Hindus simply believe the river is pure. In religious doctrine
the story is that the Ganges was a river that flowed in heaven. The sons of a powerful
king were killed and he begged the Ganges to come to earth and wash over them, thus
allowing them to reach Nirvana. Because of this story Hindus believe that bathing in the
river cleanses one of sins and scattering ones ashes there releases him or her from the
cycle of death and rebirth.
This religious belief is what keeps people from demanding that the river be
cleaned. For EUndus there is a clear distinction between purity and cleanliness.
Regarding the Ganges specifically, they recognize that the waste can be harmful (Alley
2005,79). They are not ignorant to the fact that water contaminated with human waste is
unhealthy for drinking and bathing. They see the tons of sludge oozing into the river
every day. One of their core beliefs, however, is that “sacred power” can neutralize the
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negative impacts of such waste. One man, uniquely equipped to understand this
dichotomy says, “There is a struggle and turmoil inside my heart. I want to take a holy
dip. I need it to live. The day does not begin for me without the holy dip. But, at the
same time, I know what is B.O.D.”-biochemical oxygen demand-* and I know what is
fecal coliform.” He is the head of one of the largest temples in India and a professor in
the science department at a nearby university. He continues to bathe in the river five
times a day (Stille 1999, 58).
There are ample resources and an abundance of political opportunity here.
Various frames have been put forth in unsuccessful attempts to ignite some kind of
passion for a clean river. This example demonstrates movements’ need for a true
grievance, a key element lacking in this case. The people along the Ganges believe so
strongly in religious doctrine that even the recognition of polluted water and the scientific
knowledge to support it, cannot keep people out of its waters.

Conclusion: What All This Proves
I had several aims at the outset of this paper. I wished to reiterate the fact that
movements rely on external resources, but also that internal resources are incredibly
valuable. Internal resources are provided by movement participants and in order for
people to join a movement and bring their assets with them, they must be sufficiently
motivated. I also, by exploring the Ganges case, intended to refute the resource
mobilization argument that some grievance always exists, and with the proper
environment, a movement will emerge.
I do think that quite often people have some sort of underlying complaint but they
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are willing to cope with it because the cost of action is not offset by whatever gains are
possible. Leaders recognize this and use collective action frames to encourage people to
join a movement by making the problem appear worse than it might be perceived
otherwise. They make success seem more possible, and costs (if they cannot be
downplayed altogether), seem worth the risk. Often, with the proper frame, movement
leaders can coax hesitant people into action.
In many cases, indeed in most cases, there is motivation to be found, as some
resource mobilization theorists purport. If a movement can create an environment where
participants have something to gain, even if it is simply the camaraderie and
companionship of belonging to a group, and if participants have little to lose, movements
can materialize and persevere. Resources play a large part in lowering the cost of
movement involvement and thus are important to their ultimate success. It seems that a
very convincing argument could be made for the claim that a movement cannot be
successful without plenty of resources. What this means, however, is that resources are
necessary, but not sufficient for a movement to surface and persist.
The Ganges case is the situation needed to disprove the idea that ample resources
are sufficient for the generation of a successful movement. The environment was
incredibly well-suited for a movement, but there was no true grievance. The fact that the
Ganges situation may appear to warrant an uprising to those on the outside is quite
irrelevant. A true grievance must be felt by the participants, and while social movement
frames can go a long way towards generating motivation, they certainly cannot do it all.
Sometimes it is not a question of resources or political opportunity and there is no
amount of framing that will bring people to arms. When it comes right down to it, the
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participants themselves must feel as though the cause is worthy and without that the rest
is irrelevant. Sometimes, even though it seems there should be, there just isn’t a
movement.
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